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Abstract
The Supreme Court has issued its decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, a 5–4 vote holding 
that the state of California cannot compel pregnancy-resource centers to advertise for 
the state’s abortion services. This decision represents a considerable victory for both 
the right to free speech and the conscience rights of pro-life Americans. The case con-
cerned California’s Reproductive FACT Act, which mandated that both licensed and 
unlicensed women’s-health clinics (crisis-pregnancy or pregnancy-resource centers) 
not performing abortions had to provide a pre-written notice to clients.
Though the law related specifically to abortion, free speech was the fundamental 
issue at stake. This paper analyzes the history of abortion in US legislation and the per-
spective of one of its fundamental civil rights.
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Resumen
La Corte Suprema americana emitió su decisión en el caso NIFLA v. Becerra, con 
una votación de 5 a 4, que sostiene que el estado de California no puede obligar a los 
centros de recursos para el embarazo a hacer publicidad de los servicios de aborto del 
estado. Esta decisión representa una victoria considerable tanto para el derecho a la lib-
ertad de expresión como para los derechos de conciencia de las asociaciones estadoun-
idenses pro-vida. El caso se refería a la Ley sobre la Reproducción de California, que 
ordenaba que tanto las clínicas de salud para mujeres con licencia como las que no 
tienen licencia (centros de recursos para embarazadas en crisis) que no realizan abortos 
deben proporcionar un aviso escrito previamente a los clientes.
Aunque la ley se relacionaba específicamente con el aborto, la libertad de expresión 
era el tema fundamental en juego. Este trabajo analiza la historia del aborto en la leg-
islación estadounidense y la perspectiva de uno de sus derechos civiles fundamentales.
Palabras clave
Aborto, salud, derechos.
Summary: 1. Prologue. - 2. The NIFLA v. Becerra case and the Reproductive Fact Act 
of 2015. - 2.1. The NIFLA v. Beccera decision and the question of «deceptive speech». - 
3. The legal precedents in the matter of the right to abortion. - 3.1. Roe v. Wade and the 
(up and down) path of conflict between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life. - 3.2. The Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey case and the principle of undue burden. - 3.3. The Whole Woman’s 
Health et al. V. Hellerstedt sentence: the rule of continuity of the principle. - 4. Banning 
abortion as a current trend in the USA. - 5. What if Roe v. Wade is overturned? - 6. Some 
final considerations.
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1. Prologue
At the end of June last year, the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately chose to hinder 
the path of women who are seeking information on their reproductive rights and want 
to choose to practice voluntary interruption of pregnancy. Abortion is one of the is-
sues that emotionally upsets most of American society and public discussion has often 
turned into an accusation of women who choose to make use of a right guaranteed by 
law. The strong mobilization of society on reproductive issues has split into two distinct 
thought movements that have gone head to head over the last thirty years, up until the 
most recent period that sees a turning point (and not only) towards the freedom to 
choose after receiving the fair and correct information (Yarnold, 1995). Women’s right 
to abortion - sanctioned in 1973 by a Supreme Court ruling, known as Roe vs Wade - is 
under siege by both those who freely manifest in the streets, and by the world of pro-
fessionals.
In the last three years, there has been a wave of restrictive measures that have 
limited the right to the termination of pregnancies in more than half of U.S. states. 
These restrictions have forced many clinics to close down and they have made the use 
of abortion a difficult path in various areas of the country, also due to some electoral 
outcomes that have recorded the prevalence of deputies coming from anti-abortion 
movements. The question has heavily conditioned American politics in recent de-
cades, making abortion a constant theme in every election campaign, whereas until 
a few years ago in European countries - even, perhaps above all, in the Catholic ones, 
and among them Italy - it appeared to be a theme of the past, the interest and clamor 
of which belonged to history.
The complexity of the American situation has entered the halls of the Government, 
even with provisions aimed at affecting the behavioral modalities of women: the refer-
ence is to the decision of the State of Massachusetts to guarantee the safety of women 
who enter abortion clinics with “buffer zones”, to protect them from intimidation and 
violence and to allow anti-abortion demonstrators to make pickets, distribute leaflets 
and therefore freely express their dissent (Howe, 2014)2. The connection between pri-
vate decisions and public rules does not make the choices of women less difficult: the 
2 In 2007, Massachusetts passed a law that makes it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within thirty-five meters 
of any abortion clinic in the state. Yesterday, the Supreme Court demolished the “buffer zone” of Massachusetts, siding with 
a group of opponents of abortion who claimed that the law was unconstitutional because it prevented them from being able 
to advise and offer assistance to women entering the clinics. (Così & Howe, 2014).
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perennial economic uncertainties, the unequal wage treatment between men and wom-
en, the delayed planning of the subsidiary project, the high costs of private health have 
in fact had an impact on the legislation, even affecting research projects and federal 
funding. Even though, as will be seen, the Roe vs. Wade sentence is weakened in its the-
oretical assumptions by some subsequent rulings, it continues to be the decision to refer 
to in assessing the constitutionality of state legislation3.
This historic decision of 1973 imposed a precise choice of value in favor of women’s 
freedom, by inaugurating an active role for the Court in the regulation of a subject that 
until then had been almost neglected. Precisely this activism and the incisiveness of the 
interventions substantially subtracted from the States the possibility of interacting with 
the judicial authority. However, there is no doubt that, in the United States, there is a 
gap between the prudence of the legislator and the abortion practice, which affects more 
than one point five million young American women every year and which coincides 
with the exercise of one of the most controversial fundamental rights of democratic 
history.
At present, it is even more in the spotlight due to an interest in claiming the move in 
a “restrictive” sense, in order to satisfy a large part of the more conservative electorate. 
The case in question analyzes the themes of information asymmetries in terms of health, 
the cultural capacity of women to understand the messages related to the consequences 
connected to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy and, in the background, the fate 
of reproductive rights in countries where populism - and sovereign ambitions - often 
obscure the dutiful virtuous paths of public policies.
2. The case of NIFLA vs. Becerra and the Reproductive Fact Act 
of 2015
In the Supreme Court decision in the case of the National Institute of Family and 
Life Advocates (NIFLA) vs. Becerra (2018), the judges ruled that California cannot 
force the “crisis-pregnancy” centers to publish “signs about state-sponsored abortion ser-
vices”, regardless of whether or not such facilities are composed of licensed physicians. 
3 After what seemed like a barrage of legislative attacks on abortion rights this year, some states are hitting back - as will be 
discussed later - by strengthening their laws to protect the right to an abortion. Illinois, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont have all passed legislation this year expanding access to abortion in various ways. In the 
current political climate, where some fear that Roe v. Wade is in danger of being gutted or overturned, state legislatures are 
a key battleground in the abortion fight.
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The decision has in fact supported the reasons of the pro-life defenders, and has always 
advocated the theory that states and cities created these centers in order to provide al-
ternative pregnancy services to women who do not want to abort. More importantly, the 
decision looked - and consequently favored - in a privileged manner the reasons of the 
pro-life voters, who trust in the interventions of the Supreme Court to limit the right of 
abortion in America.
The legislative substrate referred to is the Californian Reproductive FACT Act of 
2015, which was approved after the legislator and activists worried about the increase 
of the “crisis-pregnancy Centers” within the state. Many of these centers have existed for 
decades and were designed to offer services to women with unexpected pregnancies, 
but uncertain about whether and how to perform an abortion and uncertain about the 
medical pathway to be undertaken. The law states that
Existing law, the Reproductive Privacy Act, provides that every individual pos-
sesses a fundamental right of privacy with respect to reproductive decisions. Ex-
isting law provides that the state shall not deny or interfere with a woman’s right 
to choose or obtain an abortion prior to viability of the fetus, as defined, or when 
necessary to protect her life or health. Existing law specifies the circumstances 
under which the performance of an abortion is deemed unauthorized. (Repro-
ductive FACT Act, 2015)
In other words, the law establishes that California medical centers have two legal 
obligations for patients who ask for help: the first is not to interfere with the woman’s 
legal right to choose between aborting or not. In addition, the medical center must 
demonstrate that it is a practice with a medical license and with authorized medical 
personnel. Secondly, the law states that these centers must educate patients “on Cali-
fornia’s availability of subsidized health care and its eligibility criterion”. The principle of 
transparency of the law requires this information to be placed in the waiting rooms of 
medical centers, on the free vision of patients seeking information. Many people fear 
that this informational methodology could have a negative impact on women’s repro-
ductive health, in particular for those coming from poorer and less culturally trained 
environments, therefore lacking the tools to decode medical information in those Cen-
ters generally provided (Chen, 2014). This is because the main objective of the Repro-
ductive FACT Act is to allow women to know which services they can access, without 
worrying about financial costs. The law requires “a licensed covered facility” to affirm 
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the principle that “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-
cost access to comprehensive family planning services, prenatal care, and abortion, for 
eligible women” (Reproductive FACT Act, 2015).
In the period following the entry into force of this law, some of the “crisis-pregnancy 
Centers” have encountered difficulties in reconciling the religious choices of many of 
their employees and volunteers with the pregnancy termination project. In this sense, it 
was supported that California - through the enactment of the Reproductive FACT Act - 
had violated the rights of the First Amendment of these people, because it obliged them 
to operate in contempt of how much they cared about their respective consciences. In 
the NIFLA vs. Becerra decision - taken by majority - Judge Clarence Thomas agreed that 
the law could endanger the First Amendment, stating that this legislative instrument 
“imposes a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that is a wholly 
disconnected from the State’s informational interest” (NIFLA vs. Becerra, 2018). Now, 
again in the judgment of Judge Thomas, since the law selected only certain types of 
structures, there was a risk “of only limiting the speech of those who disagree with the state 
views on abortion”.
One of the great questions arising from this case is whether California can regulate 
communications in the “crisis-pregnancy Centers” as a form of “professional speech”, 
a somewhat confusing legal category that allows states to ask doctors and lawyers 
to disclose medical or ethical facts without the mediation of the professional who is 
able to simplify legal procedures or explain medical diagnoses in depth. California 
has argued that these “crisis-pregnancy Centers” are authorized medical providers and 
should be regulated to allow women not to be confused about the nature of unautho-
rized facilities for the ambiguous advertising message they launch. In particular, one 
of the judges argued that if California wanted to make sure low-income women knew 
about its low-cost family planning services, the way they chose was not acceptable. 
Another judge had a different opinion according to which the Reproductive FACT 
Act represents a paradigmatic example of the serious threat that occurs when the 
government tries to impose its message in place of the individual will. The theme that 
emerged is therefore one of balancing the rights of the First Amendment with public 
health concerns, in terms of the need to provide (potential) patients with accurate and 
correct information.
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2.1. The NIFLA vs. Becerra decision and the theme of «deceptive 
speech»
The 2018 NIFLA vs. Becerra case of the Supreme Court was framed as a debate on 
abortion rights, but a new analysis reveals that the Court has been silent on one of the 
key questions of the case: the «deceptive speech»4 and the potential violation of the rule 
of informed consent. California law has required that clinics that attend to the needs of 
pregnant women provide “one of two government notices”: one for authorized clinics 
on the availability of state health services, including abortion, and one for unlicensed 
clinics they notify to potential customers that the clinics are not authorized medical 
facilities and do not have authorized medical professionals on site. In its decision, the 
Supreme Court found that both the requirements of “government notices” violated the 
rights of the clinic, present in the provisions of the First Amendment. Although the law 
itself does not refer to the clinics in question as centers of pregnancy in crisis that op-
pose abortion, the Court found that these clinics “were targeted in an important lesson 
for policymakers”.
At a closer look, in addition to the Court’s conclusions on the ability of States to 
regulate the issue of reproductive health, the NIFLA vs. Becerra decision, seems to have 
wider implications for the government’s ability to request “purely factual disclosures in 
the commercial context” (Pomeranz, 2019). These requirements - which are essentially 
related to commercial rules - have been designed and regulated to protect the consumer 
and public health instruments intended to prevent deception or warn consumers of 
potential damage to health and safety. The courts regularly support these disclosure 
requirements5; however, as noted by careful doctrine, in the last two decades the Su-
preme Court has guaranteed greater protection for businesses and reduced deference to 
government regulations. In Becerra, the Court found that the Zauderer vs. Office of Dis-
ciplinary Counsel decision does not apply to the aforementioned requirements, because 
communications are not limited to “purely factual disclosures”6.
4 The reference is to research conducted by the NYU College of Global Public Health, published in the American Journal 
of Public Health.
5 The commercial disclosure requirements include, for example, information on calories in restaurant menus, as consistent 
with the First Amendment: in this sense, the Zauderer vs. Office of the Disciplinary Counsel decision taken by the Supreme 
Court of 1985.
6 Zauderer vs. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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It appears that the Court has deliberately avoided addressing the problem of “de-
ceptive speech”, a central theme for the reasoning to be conducted in relation to infor-
mation provided in unlicensed California clinical facilities. Therefore, the incomplete 
opinion of the Supreme Court creates new uncertainties about the government’s ability 
to request the disclosure of correct and concrete information in the context of reproduc-
tive health services and more generally in the commercial context. However, the Court’s 
silence on “deceptive speech” highlights a potential road to future regulation.
The current orientation of the U.S. Supreme Court is to believe that states can pro-
hibit abortion after ascertaining fetal viability, as long as there are exceptions for the life 
and health (both physical and mental) of women. According to this orientation, vitality 
- which can vary from 24 to 28 weeks after the beginning of a woman’s last menstrual 
cycle - must be determined on an individual basis and decisions on both fetal viability 
and women’s health are at the discretion of the physician. In addition, states may not 
require additional medical personnel to confirm the judgment of a treating physician 
that a woman’s life or health is at risk in the event of a medical emergency. The require-
ments requested by the Court concern the times and circumstances of an abortion in 
the hands of the patient and, after its viability7, the doctor.
Most states limit abortion at a specific time during pregnancy, which normally lasts 
40 weeks. In recent years, however, some state policymakers have attempted to pro-
voke a challenge to the Supreme Court, prohibiting abortion before vitality. Federal and 
state courts have consistently blocked the application of laws prohibiting abortion for 13 
weeks, but more than a third of states have successfully implemented what are termed 
“20-week abortion bans”. These bans are based on the belief that a fetus can feel pain 20 
weeks after fertilization (an estimated date of conception), equivalent to 22 weeks. Oth-
er states have enacted laws that strictly prohibit or limit abortion in the second or third 
trimester (starting from 13 weeks and 25 weeks of pregnancy respectively). In the event 
of a dispute, the courts have effectively exceeded the laws in force, introducing a general 
ban on abortion in a given week or in a given quarter, in addition to specific ones with 
exceptions relating to the right to health. However, not all of these restrictions have been 
challenged in court. As a result, some states have precepts that do not meet the Court’s 
requirements: for example, Michigan allows a post-operative abortion only if the 
7 When the Supreme Court speaks of viability, it tends to refer to “The point at which a fetus can sustain survival outside 
the womb. Determined based on the fetus’s developmental progress and may vary by pregnancy. A fetus generally reaches 
viability between 24 and 28 weeks LMP”.
According to Hart Ely (1996), the use of the concept (moral rather than legal in nature) of “viability”, which marks the 
moment when the fetus becomes “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”.
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woman’s life is in danger, a clear violation of the health exception requested by Roe. 
Furthermore, some States continue to maintain and enact new laws requiring the in-
volvement of a second doctor to certify or attend abortion in particular circumstances.
The decision of the NIFLA vs. Becerra case falls in this context: it was taken with five 
votes against four. The verdict entails the revocation of a California state law (the Repro-
ductive FACT Act, or FACTA, 2015) which will prevent forcing the fake abortion clinics 
exposing information boards on the possibility, for the women who go there, to be able 
to turn to other structures should they decide to abort. According to the provisions of 
the FACTA, the “crisis-pregnancy Centers” had to provide exhaustive information to 
patients about the possibility of free (or very low clinical costs for) abortion, and it had 
been approved given the widespread use of these centers, which are supported from the 
pro-life movement. Predictably, the law did not find favor with many “crisis-pregnancy 
Centers” and with NIFLA, which sued, alleging the violation of their right to express: 
informing patients of those practices meant forcing the staff of the clinics to go against 
one’s conscience and one’s ethical imperatives.
This was precisely the motivation accepted by Judge Justice Clarence Thomas which 
led to the Court’s ruling: many of those centers set themselves a religious mission and 
forcing them to act contrary to it would mean violating the First Amendment. Accord-
ing to Thomas, in fact, the law imposes “a requirement predetermined by the govern-
ment” which is “completely detached from the interest in informing the state” and closer 
instead to the wishes of the parliamentarians who supported it. Thomas also comment-
ed that, if the State of California intends to educate its population about the services 
offered in the context of abortion, it must do so with an adequate campaign, and not 
delegate the task to the “crisis-pregnancy Centers”.
3. Legal precedents regarding the right to abortion
The long road to legalizing voluntary abortion in the United States was fraught with 
difficulties: consider that a Connecticut state law - dating back to 1879 - criminally 
prohibited the use of any type of contraceptive (Rizzieri, 2001)8. In 1972, The Supreme 
Court held that the law was unconstitutional, as it violated the spouses’ right to privacy: 
8 As claimed by Rizzieri (2001), “In 1961 Estelle Griswold, physician and director of Planned Parenthood League of Con-
necticut, was accused of providing her patients with information on how to prevent conception, in particular by advising 
women to use particular types of birth control.”
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in other words, the prohibition involved an illegal intrusion of the state into married 
life, hindering choices that had to be referred to the exclusive will of spouses9. The ref-
erence to the right of privacy was first expressed by the Supreme Court, according to 
which, although not expressly mentioned (“unenumerated”) in the Bill of Rights (and 
subsequent amendments to the Constitution), this right had full constitutional signif-
icance and it was found in the “folds” of some Amendments10, which presupposed the 
existence of “penumbras” or “zones of privacy” from which the existence of a more 
general right to privacy could be derived.
Already at the beginning of the seventies of the last century, the movements protect-
ing women’s rights and advocating the legalization of abortion had taken a prominent 
position in public opinion. While the anti-abortionists were mostly represented by vari-
ous religious organizations, which were not able to oppose a common front to the abor-
tionists’ claims. Often finding themselves in conflict with each other, many doctors took 
to the pro-choice coalition: the category was traditionally opposed to abortion, but now 
it was demanding its liberalization, taking note of the fact that many of its members al-
ready executed it in violation of the law. In addition to recognizing the freedom to abort, 
in this context, and based on the English model, the doctor has a decisive role in the 
choice of the woman to interrupt the pregnancy. The Supreme Court in 1973 was aware 
of the role assumed by the right of privacy, and the fact that it represented a concept of 
synthesis, which contained freedom of different content within its scope. In fact, in this 
case, the Court affirmed that the content of the right to privacy was sufficiently wide 
enough to include the freedom of a woman to decide the fate of her pregnancy (Rizzieri, 
2001). Following the 1973 Supreme Court ruling, there has been a rapid multiplication 
of privately run specialized clinics. The Planned Parenthood organization is one of the 
protagonists of the abortion movement and numerous legal disputes and it has taken on 
an almost monopolistic role in the management of abortion clinics11.
In the following decades, we witness significant decisions, up to reaching the sen-
tence in comment. In recent times, American states have approved more than 400 state 
restrictions on abortion, which have contributed to the abundant misinformation about 
9 With the Eisenstadt vs. Baird decision (1972) the free use of contraceptives was also recognized to unmarried people.
10 The reference is to the First, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth and the Ninth Amendment.
11 The Planned Parenthood organization has often been accused of unfair competition with other private clinics. One of its 
accusers is the lawyer Bill Baird, historical leader of the abortion movement, according to which “Planned Parenthood goes 
into new geographic area and opens a clinic near a preexisting abortion clinic that is independent of Planned Parenthood… 
because Planned Parenthood is a recipient of large federal grants, it is able to provide abortions at a much lower fee than a 
private abortion clinic can. Hence, over the course of time, the preexisting private abortion clinic, unable to compete with 
the lower fees offered by Planned Parenthood affiliates, is forced to go out of business”.
See Yarnold (1995).
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procedures and treatments for this medical practice. These state laws restrict access and 
are often not based on medical science, as evidenced by the growth of pregnancy cri-
sis centers (CPCs), which are organizations designed to convince women not to abort. 
These structures represent a problem not only for access to voluntary termination of 
pregnancy, but for reproductive health in general. Crisis pregnancy Centers often receive 
state funding and are significantly more widespread than abortion clinics in the United 
States, and they are often located near abortion clinics in an attempt to divert patients 
from abortion centers and route them to CPCs. Recent Supreme Court decisions ensure 
that access to abortion will be an important area of political challenge for both con-
servatives and progressives, hinting at potential drastic changes in access to abortion 
services and reproductive rights more generally, all over the United States. In order to 
frame such a demanding issue, this essay intends to reconstruct the most significant 
cases in the path of women’s reproductive rights, to arrive at the latest legal decisions 
on the subject.
3.1. Roe vs. Wade e the (up and down) path of the conflict between 
Pro-Choice and Pro-Life.
In its famous abortion decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a constitution-
al right to abortion, but stated that the States could prohibit abortion after fetal vitality 
- the point where a fetus can sustain life outside the womb - if their policies meet certain 
requirements (Pomeranz, 2019). The Roe vs. Wade judgment is a very important sen-
tence of 1973. It is one of the most controversial that the United States Supreme Court 
has ever pronounced. The two parties involved - Roe and Wade - have become, (not 
only) in American culture, the representatives of two different currents of thought in re-
lation to the question of abortion: the first of the two embodies the current Pro-Choice, 
and Wade’s vision represents the spirit of Pro-Life. In Roe vs. Wade, Norma McCorvey, 
known as Jane Roe (pseudonym used for the protection of privacy), fell pregnant for the 
third time, and decided to start - with the support of the lawyer Sarah Weddington - a 
trial before the District Court against the anti-laws abortion of the State of Texas, where 
the abortion ban was in force, except in cases where the life of the woman was put at 
risk (Scheb & Scheb II, 2002). Wade, the lawyer who represented the State of Texas - 
in disagreement with the Federal Court’s decision - decided to appeal to the Supreme 
Court, which, in the aforementioned year, issued the sentence that influenced not only 
the specific case but the fate from 46 other States (Linton, 2012).
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The request, made by Weddington, for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the 
Texan law was accepted by the Court on the basis of the interpretation of Amendment 
IX of the Constitution, which mentions individual rights (including the right to priva-
cy), and the possibility of the latter being supplemented by other rights not explicitly ex-
pressed in the Constitution. The right to choose about the future of one’s pregnancy was 
included among them. Both the District Court and the Supreme Court of the United 
States declared the contested law unconstitutional, holding that the limitations imposed 
on the woman’s decision to abort violated her right to privacy, a right which, although 
not expressly provided for by the Constitution, had already been previously identified 
by the case law based on the penumbra of other rights in the Bill of rights. In particular, 
the Supreme Court stated that
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s con-
cept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as 
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to 
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. (Roe v. Wade, 1973)
However, this right was not conceived as absolute, but rather conditioned and lim-
ited by the presence of the State’s interest in the protection of potential life, whose rele-
vance is manifested increasingly in the course of pregnancy.
The State’s interest in protecting women’s health, on the one hand, and that of pro-
tecting potential life, on the other, were then outlined by the Court distinguishing three 
different phases with reference to the evolution of pregnancy:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion 
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant 
woman’s attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the 
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regu-
late the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c)  For  the  stage  subsequent  to  viability  the  State,  in  promoting  its  interest  
in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion  except  where  necessary,  in  appropriate  medical  judgment,  for  the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother. (Adams, 2005).
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With 7 votes in favor and 2 against, on 22nd January 1973, the Supreme Court 
delivered a sentence that today still represents a precedent in primis for the right to 
abortion in the American panorama, and even worldwide. With this sentence, in fact, 
abortion is legalized in the United States, harmonizing a discipline that up until then 
had been independently regulated by each individual state. According to the legisla-
tion of some States, the possibility of interrupting the pregnancy was foreseen only in 
the cases in which the life of the woman was in danger, following a rape, or for fetal 
malformations; in others, however, it was forbidden in any case. As established by the 
Court, in 1973 women were recognized as having the right to decide whether to con-
tinue or terminate a pregnancy, based on the interpretation of the XIV Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, according to which no State can put in place or give 
executing laws that disregard the privileges or immunities enjoyed by US citizens as 
such; and no State will deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without “due 
process of law”, nor will it deny anyone, within the scope of its sovereignty, “equal 
protection of the laws” (Barsotti, 1999).
3.2. The Planned Parenthood vs. Casey case and the principle of 
undue burden
In 1992, the attention of the supreme judges again focused on the topic of volun-
tary interruption of pregnancy with the case of Planned Parenthood vs. Casey12. In this 
sentence, with the favorable vote of 5 judges, the Supreme Court expressed itself again 
in favor of the “Roe” theory, introducing the principle of “undue burden”, which meant 
the impossibility on the part of the State legislation to introduce obstacles aimed at 
12 According to the Court’s opinion expressed in this decision, abortion “[involves] the most intimate and personal choices 
may make a lifetime, central and personal liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is to de-
fine one ‘s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs on these matters 
could not define themselves with the state”.
In this ruling, the question of constitutionality concerned five articles of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982. 
The articles set specific requirements before granting access to the IVG: informed consent given at least 24 hours before 
the procedure; in the case of the presence of a minor, the informed consent of a parent or approval by a judge; in the case 
of a married woman, declaration of having notified the spouse of his intention to abort.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act excluded the requirements listed above in the event of a medical 
emergency.
In this decision - characterized by a strong division (4 to 3) - the Court reaffirmed its decision in Roe vs. Wade in which 
the Court recognizes the right of a woman to be able to abort; has decided that the limits to the right to access IVG must be 
based on the so-called “Undue burden test” (excessive burden test): it has been argued that the definition of “emergency” 
is wide enough to not consist in an excessive burden; stated that informed consent and parental consent in the case of a 
minor does not correspond to an excessive burden and stated that the requirement that a married woman must certify that 
she has notified her spouse constitutes an excessive burden and is therefore invalid..
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making it more difficult for women to choose and implement abortion. The sentence 
of the Planned Parenthood vs. Casey case abandoned the “theory of semesters” in favor 
of the so-called fetal viability threshold13. According to the majority of judges, in fact, a 
fetus would be considered “vital” much earlier, perhaps at the twenty-second or twen-
ty-third week of gestation: with such pronunciation, it was indicated to the States that 
they did not necessarily have to wait for the third quarter to ban the abortion. This is 
because - again according to the judges of the Planned Parenthood vs. Casey case - the 
technological progress in the medical field has rendered the temporal scan underlying 
the sentence on the Roe case obsolete.
In 1982, Pennsylvania had approved the Abortion Control Act, which required wom-
en to give their “informed consent” before abortions could be performed, and imposed 
a 24-hour waiting period on women willing to voluntarily stop pregnancy, during which 
information was provided on the practice they were about to perform, the possible side 
effects, the fate of the fetus, and the physical consequences that could be encountered. 
The Abortion Control Act also provided that minors - who had wanted to abort - should 
have obtained prior informed consent from their parents, except in cases of “hardship”, 
in which a court can renounce this requirement; and that, except in “medical emer-
gencies”, a wife who intends to perform an abortion must inform her husband of her 
plans before carrying out the operation. Finally, the Act required that all Pennsylvania 
abortion clinics inform the state of their activities. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit against the State, claiming that the Abortion Control Act 
violated the Supreme Court ruling in Roe vs. Wade.
In 1992, after many advances, the Supreme Court issued a ruling on this case, which 
reiterated what was stated in the Roe vs. Wade judgment, but at the same time support-
ing the constitutionality of most Pennsylvania laws. Taking up many of the arguments 
put forward about the Roe case, the Court first declared that a woman’s decision to abort 
implies very important “liberty interests” and “privacy interests”, which the Constitu-
tion’s Due Process Clause protects from state interference. Read in conjunction, these 
interests form a “substantive right to privacy” that is protected from state interference in 
13 The sentence on the Roe case sought to find a balance between women’s rights and the state’s interest in protecting the 
potential life of the conceived. Judge Harry Blackmun had ruled that, with regard to the first thirteen weeks or so of preg-
nancy, states should fully respect a woman’s right to abortion.
Starting from the second quarter, and up to the twenty-seventh week approximately, the States can intervene in the regula-
tion of the procedure, but only in case of “reasonable danger for the health of the woman”. Finally, during the last thirteen 
weeks of gestation, when most fetuses are “vital” (that is to say, able to survive outside the maternal womb), the States have 
an “urgent” interest in the child. and can therefore completely forbid abortion (except in cases where the pregnancy threa-
tens the life or health of the woman, in which case it must always be allowed).
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fundamental issues such as marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
and child rearing. The Court then reiterated that this right also protects the abortive de-
cision, because it involves equally personal questions about the autonomy of a woman’s 
choices, her personal sacrifices, emotional and mental health and the fundamental right 
to define boundaries and determinations of one’s life.
With the reaffirmation of the constitutional right to abortion, the Court then re-
iterated Roe’s sentence. Firstly, according to the sentence, the States cannot prohibit 
abortions before the “viability point” (the point where the fetus is able to support life 
outside the womb), and secondly, that under no circumstances can States prohibit abor-
tions that help preserve the life or health of the mother (Dworkin, 1996)14. To the same 
extent, the Court has also rejected some parts of Roe sentence, believing that the State 
can legally approve laws that protect the life and health of the fetus or mother in much 
wider circumstances. For example, while in the Roe case, the Court had ruled that the 
state could not regulate any aspect of pregnancy terminations performed during the 
first quarter, the Court then held that states could approve such regulations that had an 
effect on the first trimester of life of the fetus, but only to safeguard a woman’s health, 
not to limit her access to abortion. Finally, the Court proclaimed that any regulation 
imposing a “substantial obstacle” that prevents a woman from obtaining a legal abortion 
is considered an “undue burden” that violates the constitutional right of women to abor-
tion. With these new rules set by the decision Planned Parenthood vs. Casey, the Court 
examined the law of Pennsylvania and measured its constitutionality. 
3.3. The Whole Woman’s Health et al. vs. Hellerstedt sentence: the 
rule of continuity of the principle
In the sentence Whole Woman’s Health et al. vs. Hellerstedt of June 27, 2016, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court again ruled on abortion, with a decision accepted as the most 
significant on the subject for more than twenty years, sanctioning the constitutional 
illegitimacy of two provisions of the State of Texas, provided for in House Bill 2 (H.B.2.), 
which raised the safety standards required of clinics and professionals, specialized in 
abortion services (so-called abortion providers) (Siegel, 2016; Urley, 2016).
The first of the two provisions, the so-called admitting-privileges requirement, re-
quires each structure to have a privileged contact with a hospital located less than 30 
14 For a detailed analysis of this volume, see Giordano – Langford (2017).
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miles away. The second, so-called surgical-center requirement, requires these struc-
tures to comply with the minimum safety standards set for surgical surgeries (Chiere-
gato, 2016)15. According to a well-known anti-abortion strategy undertaken by many 
States, these measures have represented a classic example of a Targeted Regulation 
of Abortion Providers (TRAP). This formula refers to the numerous state provisions 
that, for the declared purpose of protecting health of women, impose increasingly 
stringent burdens and requirements on operators who practice abortive services to 
consistently reduce the number and, in doing so, limit the concrete exercise of the 
right to abortion.
The judges of the Court, with a majority of 5 to 3 (for a total of 8 judges instead of 
9, due to the death of Judge Scalia not yet replaced at the time of the ruling), stated 
that the Texas law violated the principle of “undue burden”, as already established in 
the 1992 sentence. The Court took the opportunity to specify the undue burden test, 
which is the principle according to which state provisions that impose an excessive 
burden on the right to abortion are constitutionally illegitimate, and have the purpose 
or effect of posing a substantial obstacle to women in the free exercise of their own 
will to abort. On that occasion, the Court warned about the risk on the right to decide 
on terminating a pregnancy if it was affected by health provisions that had little to 
do with promoting women’s health. The words of the Court were the following: “as 
with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or 
safety of a woman seeking an abortion”; however “unnecessary health regulations that 
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
abortion impose an undue burden on the right”. The political value of this sentence 
is affirmed by the opinions of one of the most authoritative judges of the Supreme 
Court, according to which
so long as the Court adheres to Roe v. Wade, and Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. V. Casey, Targeted Regulation to Abortion Providers laws like H.B.2 
that do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion can-
not survive judicial inspection.16
15 The author claims that “If at first sight the case would seem to concern solely the provision of health services, these 
measures have, on the contrary, profound implications on the constitutionally protected right of every woman to decide 
freely to terminate a pregnancy, recognized in the American order since the historic Roe vs. Wade case”.
16 The reference is to the US Supreme Court judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg who, in joining Judge Stephen Breyer in the ma-
jority opinion, wrote her fierce and concomitant opinion, warning the legislator that unnecessary medical restrictions on 
the right to abortion “Will never be tolerated by the High Court”.
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4. Banning abortion as a current tendency in the USA
Going back to dealing with abortion on several occasions, and using the power of 
self restraint in a limited way, demonstrates not only the importance of the issue for 
American society, but also the awareness of the Supreme Court about the political role 
it assumed in the matter under consideration. Abortion rights have been at the center 
of U.S. state legislation in the first three months of 2019, too. While some States have 
taken measures to protect access to abortion, these efforts have been overshadowed 
by more incisive attempts to restrict access. In fact, anti-abortion policy makers have 
wasted no time in revealing their goal: banning abortion. Although the overall number 
of restrictive abortion regulations introduced so far in 2019 is essentially the same as in 
the first quarter of 2018, the extreme nature of this year’s impositions is unprecedented. 
The State of New York led the way when it issued the Reproductive Health Act on January 
22nd, on the 46th anniversary of Roe vs. Wade. This new law has affirmed the right to 
abortion until the fetus is viable and when the life or health of the patient is at risk17. 
The same legislative provision also repealed the decision of the State according to which 
abortion is provided by a doctor. Similar legislation was passed by the first legislative 
chamber in New Mexico18, Rhode Island and Vermont. With the addition of New York, 
10 States have established legal protection for abortion. In particular, conservative state 
legislatures are trying to issue abortion bans in the hope of initiating a lawsuit that will 
give the U.S. Supreme Court, and its majority of conservative judges, ample opportuni-
ties to undermine or eliminate abortion rights.
The legislation in question in 28 States prohibits abortion in various ways, introduc-
ing rules that automatically make abortion illegal if the provisions of the Roe vs. Wade 
case were overturned, or by imposing gestational age prohibitions that prohibit abortion 
at a specific point in pregnancy (such as at 6, 18 or 20 weeks after the last menstrual pe-
riod) or lay down rules prohibiting abortion based on fetal characteristics (such as sex, 
race or disability); or, finally, rules to prohibit specific types of abortion. These regressive 
attacks on the right to abortion are only part of the story. Concerned about the future of 
17 The law of the State of New York would extend the guarantee of state coverage of contraceptives, requiring private 
insurance plans to cover, without shared costs, all the contraceptives approved by the FDA, emergency contraception and 
male and female sterilization. It would also allow members of private and Medicaid health programs to obtain a 12-month 
supply of their chosen contraceptive method.
18 The law of New Mexico would extend the existing law up to the request for private insurance plans to cover, at no shared 
cost, at least one of each type of contraceptive approved by the FDA (including any type that a supplier considers medically 
necessary), emergency and sterilization contraception, as well as maintenance and follow-up services. It would also require 
the Medicaid state program to cover 12 months of contraceptive prescription.
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such rights under the aegis of a hostile U.S. Supreme Court, progressive lawmakers in 13 
States are pursuing legislation that affirms abortion rights, establishing a legal standard 
for such practice or repealing existing restrictions.
Meanwhile, although these rights are at the center of many state legislatures, repro-
ductive health problems linked to access to contraceptives and sexual education have 
also been discussed and addressed. In particular, both are under the lens of politics: 
the request for complete sex education in schools, as well as a legislation, which would 
ensure the coverage of contraceptives in health insurance plans, allowing pharmacists 
to write prescriptions for their free use. More specifically, in the first quarter of 2019, 
the governors of four states (Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi and Utah) signed a total 
of eight measures prohibiting abortion and other related reproductive rights. Similar 
measures had already been approved in Arkansas and Georgia and had been adopted by 
a legislature chamber in six other states. While the approaches vary from state to state, 
one thing is clear: these efforts to ban abortion violate the fundamental indications of 
the United States Supreme Court that protect abortion rights in a general sense, limiting 
the possibility of a state contracting or the right of access.
The most important trend in the restrictions on abortion rights are those legislative 
documents that prohibit abortion at six weeks, once a fetal heartbeat has been detected. 
Until the end of March 2019, these restrictions were enacted in Kentucky and Missis-
sippi, approved in Georgia, while one of the chambers was approved in Missouri, Ohio 
and Tennessee. The new law in Kentucky would have entered into force immediately, 
but a federal district court issued an order that blocked its execution. The legislation of 
the Mississippi should come into force in July. Only two other states, Iowa and North 
Dakota, have issued bans on abortion during the first six weeks of pregnancy, which 
have been canceled by the courts19.
19 These bans have also been extended to other states: the governors of Arkansas and Utah have approved the prohibition 
of abortion at 18 weeks of pregnancy, allowing - for the first time - that abortion be practiced in this temporal stage of the 
pregnancy of a woman. Kentucky has banned abortion based on the alleged fetus race or sex or based on the diagnosis of a 
genetic abnormality (this law, like the law of Kentucky banning abortion at six weeks, is not in effect due to of an ongoing 
legal action), and Utah has enacted a law banning abortion when a fetus is diagnosed or thought to have Down syndrome: 
this law should come into effect in May. Currently there are eight states that prohibit abortion for sex selection purposes. 
Furthermore, Arkansas and Kentucky would become the fifth and sixth states to ban abortion if Roe v. Wade was turned 
upside down.
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5. What if Roe vs. Wade was overturned?
Basically, since the Roe vs. Wade case, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed 
the fundamental right to abortion, allowing - at the same time - new limits to a woman’s 
ability to exercise the right to voluntary interruption of pregnancy (Siegel, 2008). The 
composition of the Court - after the appointment of Judge Brett Kavanaugh in 2018 - 
became more conservative, and it was clearly expected that more States would contest 
the protections produced in the Roe vs. Wade case, limiting abortion in the early stages 
of pregnancy. Indeed, changes to the composition of the United States Supreme Court 
in 2018 raised the possibility that the Roe vs. Wade case could be seriously undermined 
- or even overturned - essentially leaving decisions concerning the legalization of abor-
tion to the individual States.
A reversal of the Roe vs. Wade case could establish an alternative legal route, a widely 
seen tactic as an attempt to provoke a legal challenge to a pillar decision for fundamental 
rights. In fact, many of these prohibitions - approved by the states - have been blocked 
by court orders that lead to further legal action. Other prohibitions were issued after 
Roe was designed to be “triggered” and take effect automatically, or following a rapid 
state action if Roe was overthrown. As mentioned above, several States even have laws 
declaring the intention to ban abortion to the extent allowed by the US Constitution, 
making clear the desire to stop access to abortion in the individual State. Meanwhile, 
lawmakers in some states have passed laws to protect abortion rights without relying on 
the Roe decision. Most of these policies prohibit the state from interfering with the right 
to obtain an abortion before the vitality of the fetus or when it is necessary to protect a 
woman’s life or health.
In other words, despite the weightiness of the Roe vs. Wade case and the extensive 
literature created around the decision, the laws of individual States carry out projects 
aimed at limiting the operation of the constitutional right to voluntary interruption of 
pregnancy in accordance with a political vision aimed at compressing rights and in-
creasing controls. Precisely in this sense, the State of Alabama, on May 14, 2019 ap-
proved - with a Republican majority - the HB 314 law which prohibits abortion even 
in cases of rape and incest. The only exceptions are the serious risk for the health and 
life of the mother, but the danger must be documented. Outside these cases, abortion is 
punished as a class A crime (up to 99 years in prison, excluding mothers). It is therefore 
a law that could lead to the challenging of the “Roe vs. Wade case” before the Supreme 
Court.
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After the approval of the law in Alabama, which prohibits abortion even in the event 
of incest or rape, another U.S. State is preparing to launch a new tightening on the ter-
mination of pregnancy. In fact, the Senate of Missouri has approved a law that limits the 
period in which one can abort. It is limited to eight weeks compared to the current 21 
weeks and six days20. The only exceptions are cases of “medical emergencies”, but even 
in this case rape and incest. Now we need the vote of the State Chamber, controlled by 
Republicans like the Senate.
6. Some conclusive thought
After what seemed like a barrage of legislative attacks on abortion rights last month, 
some States are hitting back by strengthening their laws to protect the right to an abor-
tion. Illinois, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont have 
all passed legislation this year, expanding  access to abortion in various ways. In the 
current political climate, where some fear that Roe v. Wade is in danger of being gutted 
or overturned, state legislatures are a key battleground in the abortion fight. Legislatures 
and courts alike have been testing the very limits of the constitutional protections ce-
mented in Roe. As deference to Roe wavers in the courts, advocates of abortion access 
are paying close attention to enacting proactive legislation as a strategy.
New York’s Reproductive Health Act, passed this January, is a sweeping measure 
that codifies the protections of Roe within state law. The NY law regulates abortion as 
healthcare, rather than a criminal act, and expands the types of qualified healthcare 
professionals that may provide abortion. It also extends post-24 week protections where 
a pregnant individual’s health or life is in danger, or the fetus is not viable. New laws 
in Rhode Island, Illinois, and Vermont were also signed into law earlier this month, 
providing broader protections for individuals seeking abortion care. For reproductive 
rights advocates, these are legislative victories that come on the heels of a decades-long 
battle.
Before the most recent wave of proactive legislation, just eight states had statutes 
codifying the right to an abortion up to viability, according to data published by the 
Center for Public Health Law Research’s Abortion Law Project. Available on LawAtlas.
20 This is also playing out on the national stage as the Fifth Circuit in June Medical v. Gee seemingly sent a direct challenge 
to Whole Woman’s Health where the Fifth Circuit upheld Louisiana abortion restrictions that were basically identical to the 
Texas restrictions that were struck down. How June Medical is ultimately resolved will have ramifications for telemedicine 
in this particular context. 
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org, the data also explore court opinions that interpret state constitutional provisions, 
such as the right to privacy, as protecting abortion rights. State law initiatives such as 
these are significant for a few reasons. Most obviously, they unequivocally guarantee 
the right to abortion by enshrining protections in statutory law, meaning that even if 
the courts fail to uphold the decision in Roe, citizens in states like New York would still 
have abortion access. Additionally, public support for these laws could help to remove 
the stigma surrounding abortion and frame it as healthcare, rather than continuing to 
criminalize abortion providers and their patients.
Furthermore, there’s an increasing chance that states will feel encouraged to follow 
suit by passing similar legislative measures, as demonstrated this year. Though not al-
ways rooted in evidence-based practice, states have the ability to set an example for 
other lawmakers and lead the way for further innovation. We’ve seen instances of how 
legislation can catch on like wildfire at the state level, for better or worse. Fetal heart-
beat bans and many other types of state abortion restrictions are proposed as a result of 
“model legislation” pushed out by special interest groups in a nationwide strategy. With 
abortion rights perceived to be under threat at the federal level, some advocates are tak-
ing a page out of their opponents’ playbook by enacting proactive state laws.
As these battles unfold in state legislatures, it is important to remember who will be 
the most affected. Lawmakers in Illinois claimed to be “building a firewall around Illi-
nois to protect access to reproductive healthcare for everyone”. While privileged women 
with the means to travel across state lines will continue to have access to the services 
they need, historically it was black and brown bodies who had their autonomy stripped 
away by oppressive political and social institutions. Today, women of color still seek 
abortions at a much higher rate than white women do, attributed to the lack of afford-
able healthcare and other manifestations of institutionalized racism. When 75 percent 
of women seeking abortion are low-income, barriers to safe abortion care hit hardest 
among those lacking the resources. So while state-by-state initiatives are a crucial tool 
that finally seems to be paying off in the fight for reproductive justice, the larger chal-
lenge ahead is ensuring that access to healthcare is no longer dependent upon a person’s 
income level or zip code (A.R. Ghorashi, 2019)21.
It is legitimate the concern of a restrictive view about the rights that the popula-
tion deemed acquired in the catalog of fundamental values. While considering that 
a different political orientation, physiologically, brings with it changes that affect the 
21 When It Comes to Abortion Restrictions, State Legislatures Try Fighting Fire with Fire, in blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu
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lives of citizens, the case in question has a particular value because it is based on a 
deceptive assumption and postulates the denial of a right that has its roots in the prin-
ciple of self-determination of the woman in the choices concerning her person. The 
difficult events concerning the right to voluntarily interrupt pregnancy also reflects 
the decision regarding the extension of the personality to the fetus, which cannot be 
dealt with here. It is plausible to say that it is the task of the Constitution to allow or 
prohibit abortion explicitly, avoiding the judge “having to face an impossible interpre-
tative undertaking that would inevitably lead him to an arbitrary decision” (Dwork-
in,1996)22. Therefore, if it is the Court’s task to faithfully interpret the Constitution 
and safeguard its values, through which popular sovereignty is exercised, the task of 
replacing the state legislator is not given. It is thus only up to the State to regulate the 
matter, and therefore establish the deadline to which a woman is allowed to terminate 
the pregnancy.
In the background, suggestions and reflections remain which have given voice to 
daring and truthful considerations: generally women who choose to have an abortion 
neither wished nor wanted to get pregnant. If they find themselves in this state, it is 
because men are in control of sexuality, define the conditions, decide and impose the 
moment and the way in which the relationship must unfold, attribute a stigmatizing 
social meaning to female employment of contraceptives - an act interpreted as a per-
manent and universal declaration (direct to all) of a woman’s sexual availability and, 
therefore, also as a denial at the root of the possibility of being raped (Mackinnon, 
2012). This vision coincides with the battle for reproductive freedom that for a long 
time did not contemplate the right of women to oppose a rejection of an unwanted 
sexual relationship (Lonzi, 1971)23. In American iconography, the right to abort - de-
spite the work of sensitive jurists - has not been perceived as freedom from the repro-
ductive consequences of a sexuality defined by men and centered on the heterosexual 
genital relationship. This absence of paradigm has prevented it from reflecting and 
concretely express the conditions of gender inequality. As stated, “As long as women 
do not exercise control over their sexuality, abortion will facilitate the sexual avail-
22 Taking into mind “If a fetus is a constitutional person, then states not only may forbid abortion but, at least in some 
circumstances, must do so”.
23 The author states that “Conception is the result of a violence of male sexual culture on women, which is then empowered 
by a situation that instead has suffered. By denying them the freedom to abort, man transforms his abuse into a woman’s 
fault. By granting her such freedom, man relieves her of her condemnation by drawing her into a new solidarity that remo-
tely removes the time when she asks herself if she goes back to culture, that is to say to man’s dominion, or to anatomy, or 
natural destiny, the fact that she becomes pregnant”. And again: “The legalization of abortion and even free abortion will 
serve to codify the voluptuousness of passivity as an expression of the female sex (..) The woman will seal the phallocratic 
sexual culture through a de-dramatized exercise of her use”.
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ability of women. In other words, in conditions of gender inequality, sexual liberation 
understood in this way does not free women, but male sexual aggression” (Mackin-
non, 2012).
The reference made by the Roe sentence to the doctrine of privacy identifies a con-
cept of State that limits its interference in individual choices so that everyone can in-
teract freely and consensually on an equal footing. However, given that the intimate 
sphere is certainly the battleground between opposing ways of understanding emo-
tional relationships and possible consequences, it is there that the inequality between 
men and women manifests itself and it is precisely for this reason that feminism has 
strongly asserted that the staff is political. Therefore, in the present time, the places of 
existence of women where the vulnerability of their condition is most revealed - power 
over body, heterosexual relationships, reproduction, affective life -, coincide with the 
areas in which the violence is physical and psychologically perpetrated, marital rape, 
exploitation of female labor (Giolo,2012; Faralli, 2015; Casadei, 2017). Even the role of 
hard-working barrier, carried out over time by the American Supreme Court, gives way 
to intolerance and insensitivity towards the path of individual rights and freedoms. To 
the militant jurist the role of sentinel of rights.
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